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Abstract
Florida House Bill 221 was signed into law on May 9, 2017.1 With the enactment of the Bill,
Florida joins forty-six other states, and the District of Columbia, in enacting statewide legislation
to legalize and regulate transportation network companies (“TNC”), such as Uber and Lyft.
KEYWORDS: transportation, fees, taxes

Ibarcena: Going Under The Hood: The Winners And Losers Of Florida's Transpo

GOING UNDER THE HOOD: THE WINNERS AND LOSERS OF
FLORIDA’S TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES LAW
CARLOS IBARCENA*

I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.
VI.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 45
THE ARRIVAL OF FLORIDA’S TNC LAW .......................................... 47
A.
Background: The Road to State Law ................................. 47
B.
Florida Joins the Ninety Percent ........................................ 49
FLORIDA’S TNC LAW ...................................................................... 50
A.
TNC Drivers as Independent Contractors .......................... 50
B.
Minimum Insurance Requirements ..................................... 52
C.
Reporting Requirements...................................................... 53
D.
Pay to Operate: Fees and Tailor-Made Taxes................... 53
1.
The Regulatory Cost to Operate for TNCs ............ 53
2.
Custom Made TNC Taxes ..................................... 54
AIRPORTS & TNCS: A LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP ........................ 55
A.
Background: Airports and Revenue ................................... 55
B.
The Arrival of TNCs at Airports ......................................... 57
C.
Landscape of TNC Laws at Airports ................................... 60
D.
Florida’s Airports & TNCs ................................................. 61
1.
Florida’s Valuable Airport Opportunity ................ 61
2.
Airport Authorities Under Florida’s TNC Law ..... 61
WHY FLORIDA’S TNC LAW GIVES TNCS A FREE RIDE .................. 55
A.
Potential Issues: Oversight ................................................ 65
B.
Lack of Economic Support .................................................. 66
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 68
I.

INTRODUCTION

Florida House Bill 221 was signed into law on May 9, 2017.1 With
the enactment of the Bill, Florida joins forty-six other states, and the District
*
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of Columbia, in enacting statewide legislation to legalize and regulate
transportation network companies (“TNC”), such as Uber and Lyft.2 The
law will provide these companies with a uniform set of operating standards
throughout the state.3 The new law contains provisions addressing key
policy arguments, which include the classification of TNC drivers, insurance
requirements, background check requirements, administrative and reporting
requirements, and the regulatory authority under the new regulatory scheme.4
The law, which preempts all local regulations enacted before the law’s
effective date and puts TNCs exclusively under state regulation going
forward, carves out a small, but significant, exception allowing the operating
authorities of airports and seaports to retain control over setting pickup fees
and logistics within such locations.5
This Comment will provide an overview of Florida’s TNC law and
the current landscape of TNC regulations in Florida’s airports.6 Part II will
provide background on the local regulatory landscape before the arrival of
the state’s law and will give a brief background on statewide laws in the
United States.7 Part III will provide a brief overview on key policy issues in
Florida law.8 Part IV will analyze the operation and the impact of TNCs at
airports.9 Part V will discuss potential gaps in Florida’s law.10 Lastly, Part
VI will present a conclusion.11

1.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 627.748).
2.
GINGER GOODIN & MAARIT MORAN, TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
COMPANIES 1 (2016), http://policy.tti.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TTI-PRC-TNCsSBC-031417.pdf; Transportation Network Company (TNC) Legislation, TEXAS A&M
TRANSP. INST., http://www.tti.tamu.edu/policy/technology/tnc-legislation/ (last visited Dec.
31, 2017).
3.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 Fla. Laws.
4.
See id. § 1(7)–(11).
5.
See id. § 1(15)(a)–(b).
6.
See infra Parts II–VI.
7.
See infra Part II.
8.
See infra Part III.
9.
See infra Part IV.
10.
See infra Part V.
11.
See infra Part VI.
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THE ARRIVAL OF FLORIDA’S TNC LAW

Background: The Road to State Law

The regulation of TNCs has been a hotly contested subject, not only
in Florida, but also throughout the United States and the world.12 The arrival
of TNCs in Florida created a political storm for local politicians and
regulators.13 Uber, the largest of the TNCs, and its close rival, Lyft, arrived
first in Miami, Florida around 2014.14 When they arrived, there were no
transportation or for-hire regulations that fit the operating model of TNCs.15
For-hire regulations, those applicable to taxicabs, appeared to be the closest
fit, and thus were applied.16 However, TNCs did not conform to these
regulations and continued to operate illegally.17 In willfully choosing to not
abide by for-hire regulations, the TNCs gained a competitive advantage over
12.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 1; Brian O’Keefe & Marty Jones,
Uber’s Tax Shell Game, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 2015, at 115, 117.
13.
See Editorial, What Tallahassee Should Do on Uber, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.),
Jan. 29, 2016, at 18A; Douglas Hanks, In Email Blitz, Uber Threatens to Pull Out of MiamiDade,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Jan.
14,
2016,
2:26
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article54698295.html.
14.
Douglas Hanks, Miami-Dade Chairman Backs Off in Uber Fight, But
Sticking
Points
Remain,
MIAMI HERALD
(Jan.
15,
2016,
5:46
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article54953260.html; Brian
Solomon, Lyft Rides Tripled Last Year, but Remains Far Behind Uber, FORBES: TECH (Jan. 5,
2017, 3:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2017/01/05/lyft-rides-tripled-lastyear-but-remains-far-behind-uber/. Because both Lyft and Uber are privately held companies,
there is limited information on their financials and operations:
Lyft remains a distant second place to Uber. In the month of December, Uber
completed 78 million rides in the U.S. compared with Lyft’s 18.7 million. That
means Uber is more than four times bigger than Lyft in each company’s home
market. Abroad, Uber has tens of millions of more rides. FORBES estimates Uber
completed more rides globally in the first two months of 2016 than Lyft did all
year.

Solomon, supra; see also Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft Are Getting Pushback from
Municipalities All over the US, CNBC: TECH (Sept. 2, 2016, 1:32 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-pushback-from-municipalities-allover-the-us.html.
15.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 1; Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade
Looks to Other Cities in Struggle to Deal with Lyft, Uber, MIAMI HERALD (June 21, 2014, 6:16
PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1967467.html.
Lyft’s director of government relations stated that local regulations did not address the
business model of TNCs. Mazzei, supra.
16.
See Mazzei, supra note 15. “Miami-Dade has treated the companies as
unlicensed taxi services — and [it is] hardly the only government to do so.” Id.
17.
See Benjamin Edelman, Uber Can’t Be Fixed-It’s Time for Regulators to
Shut It Down, HARV. BUS. REV.: BUS. L. (June 21, 2017), http://www.hbr.org/2017/06/ubercant-be-fixed-its-time-for-regulators-to-shut-it-down; Mazzei, supra note 15.
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the local for-hire transportation industry, in part, through the cost-savings
The
derived from their non-compliance with regulatory costs.18
management-led rebellion against the application of local regulations to TNC
drivers, promoted by the payment of fines for drivers, appeared to be the predetermined and highly criticized strategy behind the entry to all new
markets.19 Pushing local regulations aside, TNCs aimed to hook their users
with low fares and better service.20 Once hooked, TNCs would supplement
their regulatory crusade by mobilizing their loyal user to demand regulatory
change from lawmakers.21 Grassroots lobbying was effective and led to the
creation of local TNC regulations; these regulations allowed TNCs to operate
legally, if they met the requirements.22
The enactment of local ordinances was not widespread and some
Florida counties refused to provide TNCs a pathway to operate legally.23
Even within the municipalities that enacted local TNC regulations, the
regulations varied significantly; in 2016, state legislators sought to put an
end to the chaos by suggesting the first proposals for the statewide regulation
of TNCs24. However, the Senate struck it down after the bill passed the
House.25 Undeterred, and with a new pro-TNC Senate President, the Florida
Legislature was able to pass House Bill 221 and bring the TNC regulatory
landscape to its current form.26 The Bill was signed into law on May 9,
2017.27

18.
See Edelman, supra note 17.
19.
See id. (speaking on Uber’s fight against regulators); Patricia Mazzei,
Miami-Dade Escalates Penalties Against Renegade Lyft Drivers, MIAMI HERALD (June 6,
2014,
12:01
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article1965588.html; Alyson Shontell, Cops in Miami Are Running a Sting to Catch Lyft
Drivers, BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/miamicops-are-running-a-sting-to-catch-lyft-drivers-2014-6.
20.
See Hanks, supra note 14.
21.
See id.
22.
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, Miadeco Corp. v.
Miami-Dade Cty., No. 16-21976-CIV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017). “In response to lobbying and
changes in the for-hire transportation market, the County exercised its legislative prerogative
to create a separate system of regulations for TNEs.” Id.
23.
See Michael Auslen et al., It’s Up to Rick Scott Now: Should Local
Governments Be Allowed to Regulate Uber?, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 19, 2017, 4:36 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article145556644.html.
24.
See Michael Auslen, Uber Bill Easily Clears First Hurdle, BRADENTON
HERALD: ST. POL. (Feb. 8, 2017, 5:26 PM), http://www.bradenton.com/news/politicsgovernment/state-politics/article131538319.html.
25.
Id.
26.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 627.748); see also Daniel Ducassi, Brandes: ‘This Is the Year for RideSharing
in
Florida’,
POLITICO:
FLA.
(Jan.
11,
2017,
4:38
PM),
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Florida Joins the Ninety Percent

In 2013, the California Public Utilities Commission used its
authority to legalize TNCs statewide “and define[d] the term transportation
network company,” now commonly used to define ride-sharing companies
such as Uber and Lyft.28 Soon after, in 2014, Colorado became the first state
to enact state-level legislation authorizing and regulating TNCs.29 Statewide
TNC legislation grew from thirty-three in May 2016 to forty-three in March
2017.30 As of October 2017, forty-eight states, and the District of Columbia,
have enacted some level of TNC legislation.31 The lonely hold-out states are
Oregon and Vermont.32 No two TNC state laws are the same; some laws
have similar or equivalent provisions while others differ, but the key policies
in all legislative efforts involve the level of regulation, power of local
authorities, the taxicab industry, and public safety.33 State lawmakers faced a
challenging task in writing a comprehensive law that did not overly interfere
with a free-market economy.34
Florida’s TNC law established a uniform set of regulations for TNCs
across the state.35 The key policies addressed in the law include the
classification of TNC drivers as independent contractors and minimum
insurance requirements.36 Notably, the law does not require TNCs or TNC
drivers to obtain an initial or annual permit fee before beginning to operate;
lawmakers only mandated a bi-annual submission of a compliance report
prepared by an independent auditor.37 In addition, the law expressly
preempts all existing and future local law, with the exception of airports and
seaports, which have the authority to set reasonable pickup fees.38

http://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/01/brandes-this-is-the-year-for-ride-sharingin-florida-108663.
27.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11.
28.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 4.
29.
Id. at 9.
30.
See id. at 1, 5.
31.
Transportation Network Company (TNC) Legislation, supra note 2.
32.
See id.
33.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 6–8.
34.
See Editorial, supra note 13.
35.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11.
36.
Id. § 1(9)(c)–(d); GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 9.
37.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11)(e), 2017 Fla. Laws 9.
38.
Id. § 1(15)(a)–(b).
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FLORIDA’S TNC LAW

TNC Drivers as Independent Contractors

Uber has vehemently stressed that it is a technology company, not a
transportation provider, and Florida lawmakers agree.39 The ramifications,
both legal and financial, between the classification of independent contractor
and employee for the TNCs are tremendous.40 Under Florida’s TNC law,
TNC drivers are classified as independent contractors, if the following four
conditions are satisfied:
(a) The TNC does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours during
which the TNC driver must be logged on to the TNC’s digital
network.
(b) The TNC does not prohibit the TNC driver from using digital
networks from other TNCs.
(c) The TNC does not restrict the TNC driver from engaging in
any other occupation or business.
(d) The TNC and TNC driver agree in writing that the TNC driver
41
is an independent contractor with respect to the TNC.

Two parts of the test, sub-subsections (a) and (c), share TNC’s
marketing efforts towards drivers: the liberty to decide when to drive and to
do so as a supplemental income.42 Furthermore, providing a source of
supplemental income for constituents was one of the purposes behind
enacting the law, enabling TNCs to operate under a set of uniform
regulations.43 Moreover, the liberty of TNC drivers to schedule their driving

39.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(1)(e), 2017 Fla. Laws 2;
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 3:2; Dick Hogan, Uber Ride Service Would Bring
Controversy, NEWS-PRESS (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:53 PM), http://www.newspress.com/story/money/2014/09/10/uber-ride-service-bringcontroversy/15421511/.
40.
See ZACH SCHILLER & CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y,
TAXES AND THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 1, 7 (2017), http://www.itep.org/wpcontent/uploads/ondemandeconomytaxes0317.pdf; GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 9.
41.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 7–
8.
42.
Id.; see also Hogan, supra note 39; Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare
Legislation with Overwhelming Support, FLA. TREND (Apr. 19, 2017),
http://www.floridatrend.com/article/21980/florida-house-senate-pass-rideshare-legislationwith-overwhelming-support.
43.
See Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare Legislation with
Overwhelming Support, supra note 42; Hogan, supra note 39.
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times, as required by the statute, is in line with Florida case law previous to
the passing of law.44
Sub-subsection (b) of the test touches the highly competitive nature
of TNCs.45 TNC rivals, Uber and Lyft, have always looked to gain a
competitive advantage over the other, though the rivalry reached new heights
when it was alleged that the TNCs participated in potentially illicit
recruitment practices.46 It is unknown whether these practices, or similar
ones, remain in effect or, if they are, whether courts would find them to be in
violation of the statute.47
The last sub-subsection, (d), was expressly addressed in McGillis v.
Department of Economic Opportunity,48 where the court affirmed the
decision of Florida’s Department of Economic Opportunity that a former
Uber driver was not an employee for purposes of reemployment assistance
“[b]ecause the parties’ contract explicitly provides that an Uber driver is not
an employee and the nature of the parties’ relationship was consistent with
this classification.”49 Similar agreements between Uber and its drivers have
been upheld by courts to compel arbitration.50 As of now, no court has ruled
TNC drivers as employees, though the issue is being litigated in federal
courts.51 It appears TNC drivers will be categorized as independentcontractors under Florida’s TNC law, although any change in case law or

44.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a), 2017 Fla. Laws 7;
McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 222 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017);
Hogan, supra note 39.
45.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws
7–8; Maya Kosoff, Uber Used a Secret Program Called “Hell” to Track Rival Drivers,
VANITY FAIR (Apr. 13, 2017, 8:52 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/uber-useda-secret-program-called-hell-to-track-rival-drivers.
46.
See Kosoff, supra note 45.
47.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws
7–8; McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 222. It is unknown whether a Florida court, which held that an
Uber driver was not an employee, before the enactment of Florida’s TNC statute, considered
the sabotage allegations against Uber and Lyft. McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 222. “Drivers are free
to switch between using Uber’s driver application and the application of a competitor, such as
Lyft.” Id.; Kossoff, supra note 45; Casey Newton, This Is Uber’s Playbook for Sabotaging
Lyft, VERGE (Aug. 26, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/8/26/6067663/this-isubers-playbook-for-sabotaging-lyft (detailing Uber’s Operation SLOG).
48.
210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
49.
Id.; see also Fla. CS for HB 221, § 1(9)(d).
50.
See Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-13263, 2017 WL 2197812, at *1
(11th Cir. Ct. App. May 18, 2017) (per curiam); Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv23267, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017).
51.
Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397,
1418 (2016).
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federal law could retroactively entitle a TNC driver to rights under state and
federal employment statutes.52
B.

Minimum Insurance Requirements

When it came to regulating TNCs, TNCs and insurance were
inseparable.53 The new law clearly details insurance requirements and both
operational and legal clarifications for insurers.54 The clarification provides
relief to TNC drivers and insurers.55 In the past, insurance issues included
coverage gaps and amounts, and the absence of a regulatory framework led
drivers to commit fraud by omitting information from insurers.56 The law
aims to combat omissions to insurers by mandating that a TNC driver, or the
TNC on behalf of the driver, carry insurance which “[r]ecognizes that the
TNC driver is a TNC driver or otherwise uses a vehicle to transport riders for
compensation.”57 Moreover, the insurance requirement provision of the law
adopts a similar classification of TNC activity to that of the one provided as
guidance by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”)
and mirrors that of other states’ TNC laws.58 The classification of each
activity period corresponds to distinct insurance requirements.59 Florida’s
law establishes the minimum insurance amounts to be maintained during two
distinct TNC activity periods: (1) when “a participating TNC driver is
logged on to the digital network but is not engaged in a prearranged ride”
and (2) when a “TNC driver is engaged in a prearranged ride.”60 The
insurance maintained by either the TNC, the TNC driver, or a combination of
both can satisfy the requirements.61

52.
McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 221, 225–26; see also SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra
note 40, at 4, 7.
53.
See Editorial, supra note 13.
54.
See Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(b)(1)–(8)(b)(f), 2017
Fla. Laws 4–6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748); Ellen Huet, Rideshare Drivers Still
Cornered into Insurance Secrecy, FORBES: TECH (Dec. 18, 2014, 2:45 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/18/uber-lyft-driver-insurance/.
55.
See Ducassi, supra note 26.
56.
See Huet, supra note 54.
57.
Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(a)(1), 2017 Fla. Laws 4;
see also Huet, supra note 54.
58.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8–9.
59.
Id.
60.
Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(b)(1)–(2), 2017 Fla. Laws
4.
61.
Id. § 1(7)(c)(2)(a)–(c).
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Reporting Requirements

Florida’s TNC law does not require TNCs to receive approval of
new law.62 The only administrative regulatory compliance required of TNCs
is the submission of “an examination report prepared by an independent
certified public accountant for the sole purpose of verifying that the TNC has
maintained compliance with” two provisions of the law for the preceding two
years of operation, to the Department of Financial Services.63 The first
provision covers insurance disclosures, and the second, exclusions and TNC
driver requirements.64 If the report discloses that the TNC is found to have
been non-compliant during the examination period, the TNC will be fined
$10,000.65 In the case of non-compliance, another report due the following
January, is required.66 A $20,000 fine is imposed for non-compliance
discovered in the additional report.67
D.

Pay to Operate: Fees and Tailor-Made Taxes
1.

The Regulatory Cost to Operate for TNCs

The costs and administrative requirements necessary to begin
operating legally under enacted state TNC laws vary, as does the regulatory
authority assigned to oversee permitting.68 Typically, before a permit to
operate is granted, the TNC must submit to the relevant authority “proof of
compliance with requirements outlined in the legislation, such as insurance
or driver information requirements.”69 In addition, some states require TNCs
to pay a fee as part of the initial application process.70 The fee is referred to,

62.
See id. § 1(2). TNCs do not have to submit the examination report
required by law until January 1, 2019. Id. § 1(11)(e).
63.
Id.
64.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(8), (11), 2017 Fla. Laws
6, 8.
65.
Id. § 1(11)(f).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-280.3 (2017) ($5000 application fee plus
an annual permit fee of $5000), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-606 (2016) (annual permit
fee of $111,250). Examples of regulatory authorities under TNC state laws include: Virginia
and West Virginia use the Department of Motor Vehicles; Arizona, Delaware, and South
Carolina use the Department of Transportation; California and Ohio use the Public Utilities
Commission; Nevada used the Transportation Authority. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at
8.
69.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2 at 8.
70.
See id.
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generally, as a license or permit fee.71 Annual fees range from $500 in
Montana to $111,250 in Colorado.72 Though Colorado’s flat annual fee is
currently the highest, and may be adjusted to cover the direct and indirect
costs associated with implementing the TNC law, the formulation of annual
permit fees prescribed by some states may surpass that figure.73 That is
because “[i]n some states the permit fees are proportional to the size or
extent of a TNC operation.”74 For example, Georgia, Michigan, and
Kentucky base their annual fee on a tier-system categorized by the number of
cars operating under the TNC.75 Of these, Georgia’s master license fee is the
most expensive of the three states, costing $300,000 to register 1001 cars or
more, which is ten times more expensive than the cost to register the same
amount of cars in Michigan, and over thirteen times more expensive than
Kentucky.76
2.

Custom Made TNC Taxes

With only eight states currently applying sales or a gross receipt tax
on taxi fares, TNCs do not have an overwhelming exposure to such tax.77 As
such, some states have taken the initiative to design TNC specific taxes to go
along with TNC laws.78 Nevada and South Carolina levy, on TNCs, an
assessment fee based on their gross revenue.79 South Carolina has set the fee
at 1% of gross trips, while Nevada has set the amount at 3%.80 Some states
and cities have imposed a per-ride fee or a variation thereof on TNCs.81

71.
Id. (license in Georgia and permit in Colorado).
72.
Id.
73.
See id. If a TNC had over 1000 cars in Georgia, the annual license fee
would cost $300,000, surpassing Colorado’s flat annual fee of $111,250. GOODIN & MORAN,
supra note 2, at 8.
74.
Id.
75.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2104(3) (2016); 601 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:113 §
2(4)(c) (2017); GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8.
76.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2104(3) ($30,000 for more than 1000
vehicles); 601 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:113 § 2(4)(c) ($22,500 for 501 or more vehicles); GOODIN
& MORAN, supra note 2, at 8.
77.
See SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 3.
78.
Id. at 4.
79.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note
40, at 4.
80.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHILLER& DAVIS, supra note
40, at 4–5.
81.
SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 4–5. Massachusetts imposes a
twenty-cent per-ride fee, while Pennsylvania imposes a 1.4% gross receipt tax only on rides
that originate in Philadelphia; Seattle, which has not been preempted by state law, imposes a
similar fee at twenty-four cents per-ride. See id.; Transportation Network Companies,
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These variable annual fee structures tie fee amounts to the growth and
success of TNCs, thus if the exponential growth of TNCs continues, so will
the fee revenue of these states.82 The regulatory enforcement of TNCs
comes at a cost, hence, states use the fees collected to help cover those
costs.83 In states where annual fees could become significant and surpass
enforcement costs, fee funds are distributed back to municipalities in
proportion to population or TNC trip origination.84
Aside from
administrative and operational enforcement, TNC fees can be applied in
ways that promote the public welfare.85 Seattle has mandated, in addition to
a fourteen-cent share on all TNC rides originating in the city, that TNCs pay
ten cents per-ride for the Wheelchair Accessible Services Fund.86
IV.
A.

AIRPORTS & TNCS: A LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP

Background: Airports and Revenue

Local governments, generally, are concerned only with activities that
are in the best interest of the people they represent.87 One such interest is the
establishment, operation, and management of a public airport.88 The
government units, which own and operate public airports across the United
States, vary, but they are essentially cities or counties.89 A popular form of
airport governance has been the creation of subunits of local governments,
commonly known as airport authorities.90 The authority may also possess
the power to raise funds by taxation or the issuance of bonds, if expressly
provided by the statute creating the airport authority.91 Airport authorities
are given wide latitude on their management of day-to-day operations,
SEATTLE.GOV: BUS. REG., http://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-andtncs/transportation-network-companies/tnc-companies (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
82.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SOLOMON, supra note 14.
83.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §
257.2104(3)–(4) (2017).
84.
See e.g., GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8 (South Carolina distributes
surplus TNC funds to municipalities in proportion to trip origination).
85.
See e.g., SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 5 (local government
imposed per-ride fee to be used on local transportation projects and transportation for the
disabled).
86.
Transportation Network Companies, supra note 81.
87.
See e.g., Hunter Bacot & Jack Christine, What’s So “Special” About
Airport Authorities? Assessing the Administrative Structure of U.S. Airports, 66 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 241, 241 (2006).
88.
See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88, Westlaw (database updated May 2017).
89.
Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241.
90.
Id. at 242.
91.
See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88, supra note 88.
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though “the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has significant
input into airport operations through regulatory direction.”92 To receive
federal funding, airports must comply with assurances tied to the grants.93 In
the case of FAA grants, the airport must “maintain a schedule of charges for
use of facilities and services at the airport[] that will make the airport as
self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing at the airport,
including volume of traffic and economy of collection.”94 In light of all the
applicable restrictions, airport operators have become cost-effective and have
looked to increase non-aeronautical revenue.95
Almost all airports in the United States receive federal funding, but
the majority of “their operational revenue come[s] . . . from rents and fees
paid by . . . aeronautical and non-aeronautical” entities.96 As operators,
airport authorities have the power to impose fees and other operational
directives on commercial businesses operating within the airport facilities.97
Airports receive revenue from two general groups of users: aeronautical
users, which are commercial airlines, and non-aeronautical users.98 Nonaeronautical businesses include car rental companies, parking lots,
restaurants, gift shops, and ground transportation services.99
Non-aeronautical revenue is not regulated as aeronautical revenue,
coming from commercial airlines, is regulated.100 “[F]ees charged to nonaeronautical users are not subject to the [FAA] reasonableness requirement
or the Department of Transportation Policy on airport rates and charges . . .
.”101 The FAA has limited its input regarding non-aeronautical revenues to
interpreting the self-sustaining requirement to mandate that airports charge
non-aeronautical users fair market value for the use of the airport’s
facilities.102 The flexibility and ability of airlines to challenge fees can serve
as a deterrent to airports overcharging since an airport’s non-compliance
with the reasonable fee assurance can result in a breach of the contractual

92.
Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241.
93.
Id.
94.
49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(13)–(A) (2012).
95.
Maria Z. Nucci, Allocation of Economic Risk in Nonaeronautical Airport
Revenue Contracts, 16 AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 2002, at 6.
96.
Id.
97.
See id. at 7.
98.
Id. at 6.
99.
See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d
367, 369 (11th Cir. 1987); Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241.
100.
See Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64
Fed. Reg. 7696, 7721 (Feb. 16, 1999).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
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grant.103 Unlike airlines, non-aeronautical businesses do not have the same
recourses available to challenge airport fees, which has resulted in
litigation.104 Courts have given airport regulations great deference, holding
them to be constitutional so long as the authority promulgating them can
point the regulation to being rationally related to a legitimate objective.105
B.

The Arrival of TNCs at Airports

The growth of TNCs, such as Uber and Lyft, has been exponential,
reportedly gathering up “as much as one-fourth of the U.S. ride-hailing
market.”106 One customer segment TNCs have been aggressively pursuing
has been business travelers, successfully beating out taxis in the competition
for the profitable customer segment.107 A component behind the success of
TNCs in capturing the business traveler segment has been their slow, but
persistent, entry into airports.108 Airports represent lucrative opportunities
for TNCs, but airports have been reluctant in opening their doors to TNCs.109
Though it is not a one-way street, airports also look at TNC fees as a
potential significant revenue stream.110 TNC fees provide a new revenue
stream for airports, but it is not always at a net increase to the airport’s
overall revenue.111 More passengers taking TNCs to the airport translates
into fewer parking, taxicab, and car rental fees for airports.112 These fees are
major components of an airport’s non-aeronautical revenue; “[l]ast year, the

103.
See id. at 7720, 7723.
104.
See Alamo, 825 F.2d at 370.
105.
See id. at 373–74; Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 775 (2d Cir. 1984).
106.
SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 10.
107.
Kerry Close, Why You Can’t Take an Uber Home from the Airport, TIME:
MONEY (July 7, 2016), http://www.time.com/money/4396248/uber-lyft-ban-airport/.
108.
See Jenni Bergal, Airport Parking Takes Hit from Uber, Lyft, PEW
CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (July 18, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2017/07/18/airport-parking-takes-hit-from-uber-lyft. In the United
States, “Lyft has agreements with nearly 240 airports and Uber has agreements with more than
a hundred.” Id.
109.
Close, supra note 107. Airports represent a key portion of the travel
market that TNCs are aggressively pursuing, in part, by focusing on business travelers because
11% of them use TNCs. Id.
110.
See Andrea Ahles, DFW Won’t Raise Parking Rates Again, and You Can
Thank Uber and Lyft, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (June 29, 2017, 10:57 AM),
http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/aviation/sky-talk-blog/article158814344.html
(explaining that revenue from TNC fees will have nearly doubled in three years).
111.
Bergal, supra note 108.
112.
Id.
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$3.5 billion in fees represented 41[%] of the $8.5 billion in U.S. airport
revenue not related to airlines.”113
Parking related fees have been a large revenue stream for airports for
many years, and now make up nearly 20% of non-aeronautical revenue for
airports in the United States.114 In some cases, car rental fees provide an
even larger revenue stream for airports.115 For example, at Fort LauderdaleHollywood International Airport (“FLL”), revenue from car rental fees is
“the largest source of revenue[],” making up about 30% of the airport’s total
operating revenue.116 Likewise, parking fees also provide a significant
revenue stream for airports, “typically represent[ing] between one-fifth and
one-quarter of that revenue category.”117 The impact of TNCs on airport
revenues has not been fully determined because TNCs have only been
operating under formal agreements with airports for a short period of time.118
Nonetheless, the current reduction in fees, whether short or long term, have
airport operators looking to offset the losses with TNC fees.119 In addition,
as airport operators, authorities must ensure that TNCs are abiding by the
regulations of the airport, not only for economic reasons, but also for safety,
security, and general operational matters.120 The enforcement of TNCs
requires “increased staffing costs to oversee ride-hailing operations and
increased curbside congestion, mean[ing] less money for the airport and
other public transportation services that airport revenue subsidizes.”121
Maintaining certain revenue levels for airports is also of critical
importance to maintaining operations, covering debt-servicing, and fulfilling
certain federal grant assurances.122 The reductions in revenue seen from
increases in the use of TNCs have not yet proved to be a financial risk for
airports, in part, because airports are subsidizing the reductions with fees
charged to TNCs.123 For example, the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport faced a
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
See BROWARD CTY. AVIATION DEP’T, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE
YEARS
ENDED
SEPTEMBER
30,
2016
AND
2015
13
(2017),
http://www.broward.org/Airport/About/Documents/Fssigned03272017.pdf.
116.
Id.
117.
Bergal, supra note 108.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d
367, 371 n.4 (11th Cir. 1987).
121.
Sandra Tan, NFTA Fears $2 Million in Lost Airport Revenue Because of
Uber, Lyft, BUFF. NEWS (July 6, 2017), http://www.buffalonews.com/2017/07/06/nfta-fears-2million-airport-revenue-loss-due-uber-lyft-services/.
122.
See 49 U.S.C. § 47107(b) (2012); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at
371 n.4.
123.
See Bergal, supra note 108.
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shortfall in parking fee projections, but will not raise parking rates for the
first time in five years thanks to the increase in the airport’s ground
transportation revenue, which has benefitted from TNC fees.124 For airport
authorities looking at the long term coexistence of the economic demands of
their airports and TNC fees, it is “appropriate for the [a]uthority to factor in
future development plans when setting user fees.”125 The relationship
between ground transportation revenue and capital expenditures does not
have to be perfectly aligned since one revenue stream can be used to
complement or subsidize other unrelated revenue streams, like fees charged
to airlines.126 In subsidizing airline fees, the airport becomes more attractive
to airlines.127 For instance, at FLL in Florida:
Non-airline revenues, represented 71.1% of total
operating revenues in fiscal year 2016. The main categories of
non-airline revenues, rental car revenues, parking revenues, and
concessions, have steadily been increasing over the last few years,
due to increases in passenger activity and also increases in sales
per passenger.
This increase in non-airline revenues has
contributed to the ability to maintain low terminal rents and
landing fees that result in a low CPE [Cost Per Enplanement].
This low-cost structure makes the Airport attractive to air carriers,
128
especially low-cost carriers.

Where state laws have not preempted local authorities from setting
TNC airport fees, many airports have reached agreements with the TNCs.129
The agreements vary in structure, such as a flat fee or a per-ride fee, and in
amounts.130 The agreements are products of often tense and lengthy
negotiations between policymakers and the TNCs.131 Airport authorities
bargain for an agreement that considers the effect of TNCs on the airport,
which includes lost revenue from reduced ground transportation, parking,

124.
Ahles, supra note 110.
125.
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 906 F.2d 516,
522 (11th Cir. 1990); Bergal, supra note 108.
126.
BROWARD CTY. AVIATION DEP’T, supra note 115, at 12.
127.
See id.
128.
Id.
129.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 14; e.g., Bergal, supra note 108
(Buffalo Niagara International Airport in New York will charge Lyft a three-dollar fee perride and Uber a flat fee of $180,000); Taylor, supra note 14 (Newark Airport signed a $10
million dollar deal with Uber).
130.
See Bergal, supra note 108. Lyft is charged on a per-ride basis, while
Uber is charged a flat fee, both agreements were for one year. Id.
131.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 4.
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and car rental fees, as well as enforcement costs.132 TNCs look for a fee
structure that best reflects its operation at that airport and, ultimately, as forprofit entities with shareholders, looking for the lowest cost possible.133
C.

Landscape of TNC Laws at Airports

Broad preemption language eliminating or limiting the authority of
local governments to regulate TNCs is not uncommon in enacted state
laws.134 However, a significant amount of states carve out exceptions to the
preemption for airport and seaport authorities.135 Only a small number of
states have left their state’s airport operator without any authority to impose
on TNCs fees or other operational directives.136 Within those states, the
authority left to airport authorities varies.137 The majority of those states
allow the airport to set pickup fees and operational directives.138 In some
instances, states provide parameters under which airport authorities must
abide by when setting TNC fees.139

132.
See Bergal, supra note 108. “[O]fficials estimate they could lose more
than $2 million in revenue a year from parking, taxi, and car rental fees because of TNCs . . .
.” Id.
133.
See Eric Anderson, Uber Balks at Airport Process, TIMES UNION (N.Y.),
July 12, 2017, at A1.
134.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 14.
135.
Id. at 7, 14.
136.
Id. at 7. Of the states that have left no authority to airport authorities
under respective TNC laws, Colorado is the only state home to a major airport, Denver
International Airport. See id. at 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CALENDAR YEAR 2016
PRELIMINARY REVENUE ENPLANEMENTS AT COMMERCIAL AIRPORTS 1 (2017),
http://www.FAA.gov/Airports/planning_capacity/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/p
reliminary-cy-16-commercial-service-enplanements.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170715205149/https://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacit
y/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/preliminary-cy16-commercial-serviceenplanements.pdf].
137.
Compare Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla.
Laws 11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748(15)(b)) (authority to set pickup fees that must be
consistent with those charged to taxicabs), with GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191 (2016).
138.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 7–14.
139.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191. One such state is Georgia, home to the
busiest airport in the world. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 136, at 1. Georgia limits the
fees charged to TNCs—ride share network services—and taxi services alike, to “not exceed
airport’s approximate cost” of regulating the operation of the entities at the airport. GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-1-191.
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Florida’s Airports & TNCs
1.

Florida’s Valuable Airport Opportunity

Florida recently moved ahead of Texas to the number two spot for
“overall number of passengers boarding airplanes” in the nation.140 Since
Uber’s arrival in Miami, the company’s share of the business travelers
segment increased from 17% to 67% in just two years.141 As an important
and profitable client base for TNCs, the positive trend underlies the
importance of TNCs gaining access to Florida’s airports.142 Florida is home
to four large hub airports—airports that represent at least 1% of total
enplanements in the United States.143 All four airports are within the top
thirty airports, according to total passenger enplanements 2016.144 Since
Miami-Dade—Florida’s most populous county—legalized TNCs in May
2016, the $2 pickup fee imposed on Uber by MIA has translated into over $2
million in revenue for the airport in one year.145
2.

Airport Authorities Under Florida’s TNC Law

Florida is divided by law into sixty-seven political subdivisions
called counties.146 As in the rest of the United States, subunits of local
governments have been created by law to operate airports in Florida.147
Florida’s airport authorities, through the power derived from their
Legislature, “have the right, power, and authority to enter into contracts with
one or more motor carriers for the transportation of passengers for hire
140.
Jim Turner, Florida Passes Texas in Airport Traffic in 2016, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Fla.), July 18, 2017, at 8A.
141.
Douglas Hanks, Miami Business Travelers Abandon Taxis for Uber,
MIAMI HERALD (Fla.), Feb. 1, 2017, at 8A.
142.
See Close, supra note 107.
143.
See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 136, at 1. Florida’s Large Hub
Airports listed by total enplanements in 2016: Miami International Airport (“MIA”), Orlando
International Airport (“MCO”), Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International (“FLL”), and
Tampa International (“TPA”). Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Taylor, supra note 14; Video clip: Univision Report at 2:15–2:25, Uber y
Lyft destronan a los taxistas en el aeropuerto de Miami [Uber and Lyft Dethrone Taxi Drivers
at Miami Airport], UNIVISION COMM., INC.: UNIVISION 23: MIAMI (July 25, 2017, 7:34 PM),
http://www.univision.com/miami/wltv/uber-y-lyft-destronan-a-los-taxistas-en-el-aeropuertode-miami-video.
146.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) (amended 2014); Auslen et al., supra note
23.
147.
Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 243; see, e.g., Alamo Rent-A-Car,
Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367, 368–69 (11th Cir. 1987).
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between such airport or airports and points within such county.”148 Courts
have ruled that airport authorities may charge different fee amounts to
different categories of businesses operating in the airport.149 The airport
authority’s justification for the difference in fees is “based upon its rational
assessment of the relative benefits and the extent of use of each category of
vehicles that enter the airport.”150 The legitimate purposes supporting the
different fees could be many—including the regulation and control of airport
roadway traffic, the protection of the public safety, and the need to generate
revenue from commercial users of the airport to support the provision of the
airport facilities to the public—of which only one is needed to uphold the
regulation.151
In general, the main benefit conferred upon a business operating in
the airport is the client base of travelers using the airport.152 In assessing
extent of use, courts have considered the volume of vehicles that can be
accommodated on the airport’s roadways, the number of passengers the
vehicle can carry, the safety and security costs associated with the increased
traffic congestion, and designated pickup areas as necessary to accommodate
the category of users.153 Overall, the fees assessed on businesses operating
within the airport are formulated by a form of benefit-use analysis.154 The
benefits conferred on each business are not always the same, which typically
gives rise to different fee amounts; in upholding differing fee schedules, the
Court reasoned:
As the district court found, the on-airport companies
receive substantial advantages from their presence in the airport,
including overall customer convenience and access to walk up
customers, i.e., customers who do not have reservations to rent a
car from a particular company. The on-airport companies,
however, pay negotiated rents for the space they lease in the
airport terminal and on the airport grounds. Although these rents
may be below the actual market value of the property, they do
compensate the Authority for the benefits that the on-airport
155
companies receive.
148.

FLA. STAT. § 331.15(2) (2016); Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 242,

244.
149.
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 372 (upholding different fee
schedules for different airport businesses).
150.
Id. at 371.
151.
Id. at 371 n.3–4.
152.
Id. at 373.
153.
Davis v. Miami-Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1190,
1195 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
154.
See id.
155.
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 373.
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Even though a TNC is “not a common carrier, contract carrier, or
motor carrier,” eliminating the statutory application provided, the TNC law
allows airport and seaport authorities to charge reasonable pickup fees.156
The pickup fees must be “consistent with any pickup fees charged to taxicab
companies at that airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s
facilities.”157 In comparing the benefits conferred to TNCs and taxicabs—
one being the “prime curbside real estate when it comes to picking up
passengers” that taxis and other ground transportation have access to in
comparison to the designated locations that TNCs are limited to—there are
substantial advantages to both.158 Taxicabs, unlike TNCs—which are
solicited via smartphone application—rely on street hails or, in the case of
airport pickups, hails made at the taxicab stand.159 But, TNCs do not have to
wait around in lines to pick up passengers.160 Furthermore, taxicabs do not
pass on the pickup fee to the rider, unlike TNCs; thus, profitability of taxicab
companies are affected whereas TNCs are not.161
It is presumed, by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s
text, that the Legislature intended to give airport authorities leeway in setting
the fee amount because the terms reasonable and consistent with are
imprecise.162 But with the phrase consistent with being used to set the
relationship between two monetary amounts, of which the baseline number is
less than $5, it should not result in too big of a difference.163 However, when
156.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(2), (15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 3,
11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748).
157.
Id. § 1(15)(b), at 11. The preemption exception provided in Florida’s law
is as follows:
(b) This subsection does not prohibit an airport or seaport from charging reasonable
pickup fees consistent with any pickup fees charged to taxicab companies at that
airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s facilities or prohibit the
airport or seaport from designating locations for staging, pickup, and other similar
operations at the airport or seaport.

Id.
158.
See Douglas Hanks, Transportation – Uber Getting Special Zone at
Miami International Airport, MIAMI HERALD (Fla.), May 17, 2016, at 6A; Douglas Hanks,
Taxis Suing Miami-Dade for $1 Billion over New Uber Law, MIAMI HERALD (May 4, 2016,
12:41
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article75555187.html [hereinafter Taxis Suing Miami-Dade].
159.
See Taxis Suing Miami-Dade, supra note 158.
160.
Id.
161.
See Will Robinson, Uber and Lyft Expand Statewide, Thanks to New
Florida Law, BIZJOURNALS: JACKSONVILLE BUS. J. (July 10, 2017, 10:38 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2017/07/10/uber-and-lyft-expand-statewidethanks-to-new.html.
162.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 11;
Auslen et al., supra note 23.
163.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws
11; Robinson, supra note 161 (explaining the airport rates set across some of Florida’s airports
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these nominal amounts are applied to the volume of rides currently given,
and the exponential growth rate of TNC rides at airports, they amount to
large sums of money.164 Ultimately, despite the potential disparity in the
total amount paid, mandating airports to align the fees charged to TNCs with
those of taxicabs, fits squarely into the benefits and extent of use formulation
previously used by the courts.165 Furthermore, in setting different regulatory
frameworks applicable to different users, the airport authorities do not need
to “achieve perfection or mathematical exactitude,” which is in line with the
statutory text in Florida’s TNC law.166
Moreover, the criteria set by Florida’s TNC law on airport pickup
fees is in accordance with the limited input from the FAA on nonThe FAA, in reference to the self-sustaining
aeronautical fees.167
requirement for receipt of grants, has provided that “[f]air market fees for use
of the airport are required for non-aeronautical use of the airport.”168 Though
the FAA guidance is centered more on market fees for rental rates of airport
facilities, it could be construed to have a general application on airport
facilities for non-aeronautical use as a whole.169 For instance, a TNC law
expressly requires that the fees charged at airports must be in line with FAA
regulations.170 In general, the self-sustaining assurance tied to FAA grants
goes hand in hand with airports charging competitive market-based pricing
for all non-aeronautical fees.171 Such fees “can be determined by reference
to negotiated fees charged for similar uses of the airport,” which is precisely
the criteria provided in Florida’s TNC law.172

are as follows: “Miami International Airport currently charges $2, Fort LauderdaleHollywood International Airport charges $3, Palm Beach International charges $2.50, Tampa
International Airport charges $3.”).
164.
See Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:15–2:25.
165.
See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d
367, 371–72 (11th Cir. 1987).
166.
Id. at 371; see also Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017
Fla. Laws 11.
167.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws
11; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 5190.6B, FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL: CHAPTER
17-SELF-SUSTAINABILITY (2009).
168.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167.
169.
Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed.
Reg. 7696, 7721 (Feb. 16, 1999) (explaining that self-sustaining assurance extends to the
airport receiving fair market value for providing non-aeronautical facilities and services).
170.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-1710(c)(1) (2016); Policy and Procedures
Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. Reg. at 7710.
171.
See 49 U.S.C. 47107 (2012); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167.
172.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167; see also Act effective July 1,
2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 Fla. Laws 11.
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WHY FLORIDA’S TNC LAW GIVES TNCS A FREE RIDE

Potential Issues: Oversight

The TNC driver requirement provision, included in the bi-annual
research report, is the most important safeguard of the public, because before
the TNC driver can begin driving, the driver must submit: an application
containing basic personal and vehicle information to the TNC, a local and
national background check is conducted by the TNC or third-party, and a
driving history research report is obtained and reviewed.173 The law
prohibits TNCs from authorizing a TNC driver to operate if the information
obtained on the driver through the background check reveals certain
convictions and driving infractions.174 But since the TNC’s compliance with
the provision would not be confirmed until the bi-annual check, the TNC’s
non-compliance could expose riders and other drivers to harm, especially
because the law leaves it up to the TNC or a third-party not specified in the
law’s text, to conduct the criminal and driving check.175 The foregoing state
conducted background checks revealed the degree of confidence state
legislators have in TNCs, which have been shown to be a mistake.176
Furthermore, the law mandates that TNCs retain individual ride records and
driver records for one year after the date of the ride and for one year after the

173.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11), 2017 Fla. Laws 8; see
also Adam Vaccaro & Dan Adams, Thousands of Current Uber, Lyft Drivers Fail New
Background Checks, BOS. GLOBE (Mass.), Apr. 5, 2017, at A1.
174.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11)(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 9. If
an initial or subsequent background check of a prospective driver reveals any of the following,
the TNC may not authorize the driver to operate on the TNC’s platform:
1. Has been convicted, within the past 5 years, of:
a. A felony;
b. A misdemeanor for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, for reckless
driving, for hit and run, or for fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement
officer; or
c. A misdemeanor for a violent offense or sexual battery, or a crime of lewdness or
indecent exposure under chapter 800;
2. Has been convicted, within the past 3 years, of driving with a suspended or
revoked license;
3. Is a match in the National Sex Offender Public Website maintained by the United
States Department of Justice;
4. Does not possess a valid driver license; or
5. Does not possess proof of registration for the motor vehicle used to provide
prearranged rides.

Id.
175.
See id. § 1(11)(a)(2), (b) at 8–9 (requiring TNCs to conduct background
checks for TNC drivers every three years); Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 173 (stating that
Uber conducts criminal background checks on its drivers twice a year).
176.
See Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 173.
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date that a TNC driver’s relationship with the TNC ends, respectively.177 If a
bi-annual compliance check were to reveal non-compliance regarding driver
authorization one year after a bi-annual check, relevant ride records or driver
records—or both—would not, by law, be required to be maintained by the
TNC.178
B.

Lack of Economic Support

Before Florida enacted its TNC law, most of the local governments
in the state had put together TNC regulations that allowed the companies to
operate legally.179 Though the local regulations had created “a patchwork of
local regulations that were in conflict to each other,” the regulations, in
general, provided the local governments that would be enforcing the
operation of TNCs with funds to defray the administrative and operational
oversight required.180 Miami-Dade County adopted a TNC license fee of $26
per vehicle that generated about $1.8 million for the County.181 Similarly,
Hillsborough County came to an agreement with Uber and Lyft to pay
$250,000 and $125,000 in annual fees, respectively.182 However, Florida’s
TNC law excludes any permit, fee, or license requirements for TNCs to
operate, except for pickup fees at airports.183
The preemption provision in Florida’s TNC law states that “TNCs,
TNC drivers, and TNC vehicles are governed exclusively by state law,
including in any locality or other jurisdiction that enacted a law or created
rules governing TNCs, TNC drivers, or TNC vehicles before July 1, 2017;”
essentially eliminating all local regulations, including licensing requirements
enacted before the law’s effective date.184 The law further prohibits local
governments from imposing any future economic or administrative
regulation on TNCs.185

177.

Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(14)(a)–(b), 2017 Fla. Laws

11.
178.
See id. § 1(11)(d), (14)(a)–(b), at 9, 11.
179.
See Auslen et al., supra note 23.
180.
See id.; e.g., Garin Flowers, Hillsborough Reaches Deal with Uber, Lyft,
WTSP (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:25 PM), http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/hillsborough-reachesdeal-with-uber-lyft/350501652.
181.
CHARLES ANDERSON, OFFICE OF COMM’N AUDITOR, BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS
MEETING
4
(May
3,
2016,
9:30
AM),
http//:www.miamidade.gov/auditor/library/2016-05-03-board-of-county-commissioners.pdf;
Auslen et al., supra note 23.
182.
Flowers, supra note 180.
183.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(a), 2017 Fla. Laws 11.
184.
Id.
185.
See id.
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A county, municipality, special district, airport authority, port
authority, or other local governmental entity or subdivision may
not:
1. Impose a tax on, or require a license for, a TNC, a TNC driver,
or a TNC vehicle if such tax or license relates to providing
prearranged rides;
2. Subject a TNC, a TNC driver, or a TNC vehicle to any rate,
entry, operation, or other requirement of the county, municipality,
special district, airport authority, port authority, or other local
governmental entity or subdivision; or
3. Require a TNC or a TNC driver to obtain a business license or
any other type of similar authorization to operate within the local
186
governmental entity’s jurisdiction.

Florida is not the only state that does not charge TNCs an upfront
annual cost to operate, but is one of the few among comparable states not
to.187 The decision to not impose any administrative or operational costs on
TNCs foregoes source funds for local governments that could have been
allocated to defray costs associated with the significant and increasing
presence of TNCs across the state.188 Like airports, local governments must
harmonize capital expenditures with available and potential sources of funds,
but unlike airports, local governments were not afforded the same discretion
under Florida’s TNC law.189 An analysis provided by the House of
Representative Staff concluded that as a result of the revenue elimination
from fees imposed on TNCs by local governments after the law’s
preemption, local governments “will experience an indeterminate, but likely
insignificant, negative fiscal impact.”190 The same report concluded that the
airport preemption exception “may provide a positive fiscal impact to

186.
Id.
187.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 7–8; BRUCE SCHALLER,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A BLUEPRINT FOR UBER, LYFT AND TAXI REGULATIONS 3 (2016),
http://schallerconsult.com/rideservices/blueprint.pdf; Robinson, supra note 161.
188.
See Auslen et al., supra note 23; Tan, supra note 121.
189.
See Auslen et al., supra note 23; Kevin Spear, Orlando Airport Officials
OK $350 Million Price Hike for New Terminal, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 21, 2017, 4:50
PM),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/travel/news/os-airport-terminal-cost-vote-20170621story.html. At Orlando International Airport in Florida, airport officials met and approved a
$350 million cost increase in the construction of a new terminal; in that same meeting,
officials set TNC pick up fees at $5.80, which is the highest fee in the United States and
significantly higher than the $3.30 charged to on-demand taxi services. Uber, Lyft Pick Up
Now Allowed at Orlando Airport, CBS MIAMI (June 22, 2017, 2:26 PM),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2017/06/22/ubert-lyft-pick-up-now-allowed-at-orlando-airport/.
190.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, HB 221 (2017) Staff
Analysis 8 (Feb. 14, 2017).
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airports;” the assertion has proved accurate in 2016, Miami International
Airport received over $2 million from Uber in pickup fees.191
VI.

CONCLUSION

The arrival of TNCs to the Sunshine State has been a blessing for
some; for others, it has been a lesson in how dynamic, technology-driven
business can disrupt and cripple an established player in an established
market.192 For local and state lawmakers, it is only one of the many
regulatory battles to come as technology companies continue to emerge and
disrupt outdated regulations.193 No longer should legislators be reluctant
adopters of new technologies and businesses in an effort to save the old
because “[w]ere the old deemed to have a constitutional right to preclude the
entry of the new into the markets of the old, economic progress might grind
to a halt.”194
Whether Florida’s TNC law will be considered an example of a
successful statewide TNC regulation remains to be seen.195 What the law
provided—much to the satisfaction of the TNCs—was rational insurance
requirements, parameters on TNC driver authorizations that mirrored those
the TNCs currently had in effect, minimal administrative and regulatory
costs, and oversight limited to a bi-annual retroactive compliance check.196
The law is extremely favorable to TNCs, but it ultimately enables thousands
of Floridians to gain a supplemental income, allows millions to continue
utilizing their preferred means of transportation, and injects millions of
dollars into Florida’s airports, but nothing into the municipalities whose
infrastructures and resources feed the exponential growth of TNCs.197

191.
Id. at 9; Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:15–2:25.
192.
See Douglas Hanks & Rene Rodriguez, For Uber, Loyal Drivers and a
New Fight for Benefits, MIAMI HERALD (May 21, 2015, 4:17 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article21599697.html.
“Since the company
launched in Miami-Dade in June 2014, more than 10,000 active driver-partners have taken
home more than $30 million through more than three million rides the company said this week
— net which [does not] include above the company’s commission, typically less than [twenty]
percent.” Id.; see also Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:08–2:47.
193.
See Ducassi, supra note 26.
194.
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Miadeco Corp. v.
Miami-Dade Cty. No. 16-21976-CIV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017) (quoting Ill. Transp. Trade
Ass’n v. City of Chi., 839 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016).
195.
See SCHALLER, supra note 187, at 18.
196.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)–(9), (11)(e) 2017 Fla.
Laws 4–8; Robinson, supra 161.
197.
See Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:20–3:29; Ducassi,
supra note 26.
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